Autocracies of every kind regard democratic systems as weak and inefficient. In fact, this idea dominated throughout history until relatively recent times, historically speaking. People were convinced of the absolute necessity of having a government that did not depend on the fluctuating will of ordinary people, but was instead led by experienced and competent individuals rather than by naïve men from the street: it seemed so obvious that nobody questioned it.

Only in the eighteenth century did people begin to consider elective government, and only at the end of the nineteenth century did various forms of democracy begin to prevail throughout the Western world. Even today, democracies remain the common and unquestioned system of the West, while in the rest of the world democratic and autocratic political systems compete with one another: in India and Japan, for example, we have fairly consolidated democracies; in China, as in all Arab countries, decidedly autocratic systems.

Even in the recent past, democracies came close to being crushed. In 1940, all of Europe, apart from France, England, and the Nordic countries (as well as the USA), was divided between fascist and communist dictatorships. In both cases, the justification for rejecting democracy was that democracies were too weak: the dictatorship of the proletariat (that is, of a party itself ruled by a single person) was considered necessary to establish communist society, while for fascism dictatorship was needed to make the nation great and powerful.

In fact, in both cases there were spectacular failures: fascism ended in an abyss of wars and destruction, while real socialism collapsed on its own because of economic failure in the so-called peaceful competition.

Democracies, on the other hand, won the wars against fascism and achieved levels of prosperity (for example, the Italian economic miracle) far superior to those of real socialism.

We can therefore explain this historical evolution by examining democratic and autocratic political systems.

At first glance, democracy appears to be inefficient and unstable chaos. Freedom of the press and freedom of expression naturally amplify differences of opinion. Everyone seems to be against everyone else. As Popper said: “Newspapers do not open with ‘Everything is fine,’ but with crisis, scandal, and protest.” Our information space is saturated with what does not work, but the social function of a free press is precisely to point out what may be wrong or, better yet, what could be done differently: in this way decisions can be corrected, and obvious errors and falsehoods are immediately brought to the forefront.

The noise of dissent, however extensive, is not a sign of chaos but the best means of adapting to reality.

Democracies prosper precisely thanks to diversity and conflict, which, however, must remain peaceful and open and never degenerate into violence. Democracy can be compared to a market where ideas, like goods, compete and the most effective solutions tend to emerge from below and establish themselves just as happens in economic markets: the best and cheapest products drive the less good and more expensive ones out of business.

In illiberal autocratic regimes, on the other hand, negative feedback does not exist: there are no signals of hardship and discontent necessary to reveal mistakes, and an image of strength and cohesion appears that does not correspond to reality and ignores its inevitable contradictions and conflicts.

But all this imposed cohesion, achieved by silencing contradictions and dissent, is fragile and can suddenly shatter like glass: this is what happened with fascism (Churchill said: in Italy there were 40 million fascists and then 40 million anti-fascists, but Italians are always 40 million). Similarly, after seventy years during which everyone in the USSR and the satellite countries supposedly believed in communism (except for a few dissident intellectuals), suddenly everyone appeared anti-communist.

Democratic cohesion, by contrast, appears disorderly, but in reality it is very strong because it is founded on the free conviction of citizens, who are constantly exposed to criticism of every kind.

In democracies, dissent is overcome through majority decision, whereas in autocracies the absence of dissent leads to sudden collapse as soon as criticism manages to emerge, destroying the entire narrative to which people had become accustomed: people remain silent while sinking.

Obviously democracies have their own limits and difficulties.

First of all, it is true that those who elect the government are mostly incompetent people (the famous “housewife from Vigevano”). However, these people vote according to everyday reality as it truly is, not filtered, as it is for intellectuals, through ideological schemes. If the housewife sees that the situation is improving, she confirms the government in office; if instead it appears to her that things are going badly, she votes for the opposition. This criterion is extremely effective in truly judging the actions of a government.

It is also true, however, that in this way governments are judged by their results, but these results may depend — and generally do depend — above all on factors beyond governmental control (international crises, global economic conditions, and so on). The principle guiding the citizen who is not an expert in politics or economics is essentially: “It’s raining — blame the government!”

Democracy therefore becomes more efficient if the elected government remains in office for a reasonable number of years and cannot be replaced at the first difficulty: in this way there is a greater, though always relative, possibility that it may achieve results without having continually — indeed daily — to chase after every passing event.

Government stability is of great importance. Its action is often weakened by what is called the separation of powers. If one branch of power is able to block another without replacing it, then a government will face great difficulty in trying to achieve its objectives. This happens, for example, in the United States when Congress and the President belong to opposing political parties (a “divided presidency”), and somewhat everywhere when the judiciary uses its functions instrumentally to oppose government policies it views negatively.