The Problem
The life of Israel has now been characterized for 80 years by a continuous, irreducible conflict, which at times remains subdued and at other times explodes dramatically. Generally, however, the number of victims has been limited, and it is estimated that in the 30 years prior to 2023 there were about 10,000 Palestinian victims and about 2,000 Jewish victims. But after October 7, the conflict has taken on far more dramatic proportions, with perhaps 100,000 deaths and the staggering destruction of the entire Gaza Strip, which seems on the verge of being completed with the attack on central Gaza.
And yet to us Westerners, the two-state solution seems entirely obvious and inevitable. However, it appears increasingly out of reach, and with the decision to establish new settlements in the West Bank, it seems to be vanishing altogether.
In the West, those who support the destruction of Israel (“Free Palestine from the river to the sea”) are a tiny minority—the usual fringe groups with no political influence. The majority instead favors a more restrained Israeli policy, one that would encourage the creation of two states.
In reality, even the Arab world—or rather, Arab governments—would support the two-state solution and do not back Hamas. Only Iran and its proxies have truly entered the conflict, but without achieving anything except worsening and making Gaza’s situation even more tragic.
On the other hand, can one really think that Hezbollah and the Houthis could ever occupy Tel Aviv and Haifa?
The difficulty in reaching the two-state solution, which everyone claims to want, stems from how Israel is perceived.

What is the State of Israel?
The answer obviously depends on different perspectives, which we will schematize here into four main visions (though in reality they are numerous): secular Jews, orthodox Jews, an expression of colonialism, and an enemy of the believers (Islamic).

 

For Secular Jews
The project of a Jewish homeland was proposed by Theodor Herzl following the bloody pogroms—popular uprisings more or less instigated by the Tsarist secret police (Ochrana), which also seems to have fabricated the infamous book The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
However, another problem also arose: that of identity. In the positivist era, religion as a form of national identity was almost nullified, and so the religion that had distinguished Jews from the peoples among whom they lived lost relevance. Many Jews of great importance in history were not religious at all—consider Marx, Freud, and Einstein. Mixed marriages were becoming more common, and thus Jews tended inevitably to lose their identity. A Jewish homeland in Palestine was then conceived also to preserve individuality, at a time when nationalism was flourishing.
The risk was that Jews would assimilate into the peoples among whom they lived—as indeed happened and still happens: many important figures (from Mieli to Zelensky) are of Jewish origin but are indistinguishable from their respective peoples.
Jewish identity, however, was reborn through the absurd Nazi persecutions, which led to the Shoah. From then on, the idea took root among Jews that they should never again depend on the goodwill or tolerance of others, but must be able to defend themselves (not only pray, but defend themselves—vividly shown in the film Exodus). Thus, the Jewish homeland was created to prevent assimilation, but it was revived and consolidated for the opposite reason: the inconceivable Shoah.
Today, Israeli citizens are, in large majority, non-believers or secular, though of Jewish tradition, and they view the State of Israel as their only real stronghold, the only guarantee of their survival and of their world. They would not oppose the two-state solution, but they especially fear that Arabs would accept it only as a ruse to renew their war. They fear that the West Bank, once Israel withdrew, would become like Gaza—that the Palestinian Authority (already with little support) would be overrun and replaced by fundamentalist fanatics like Hamas.

 

For Orthodox Jews
Parallel to Islamic fundamentalism, Jewish fundamentalism (the Haredim) has grown in Israel, believing that the whole of historic Palestine was given by God to the Israelites, thus approaching the issue from a religious standpoint.
Perhaps they are around 10% of the population, and they share many characteristics with Hamas: they are those Jews who demand that women be separated from men on buses and in elevators, who keep two refrigerators—one for dairy and one for meat—because the Bible says the two must not be mixed, and who will not even switch on a light on the Sabbath.
They consider themselves the chosen people and believe that all nations will be blessed through the children of Israel, who would thus take the leadership of the entire world. From this perspective, all of Palestine must belong to the Israelites by divine will, and giving up even a single inch of it would be sacrilegious. In reality, from a practical point of view, Israelis have no real need to occupy all of Palestine; the settlements generally originate from religious fanatics.

 

For the Radical Left
In the 1970s, the idea that Israel was an outpost of colonialism—created specifically to support it—became very popular in the West. This idea was then taken up by the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), led by Arafat and composed of various and often conflicting factions.
The PLO thus gained the support of the entire left, first communist and then extra-parliamentary, and to some extent of the broader left in general. Even today, there remains hostility toward Israel, even though the two-state solution is now accepted.
However, the idea of Israel as an instrument of colonialism appears completely unfounded. Clearly, supporting Israel does not help relations with Arabs, the Islamic world, or the post-colonial world; on the contrary, it creates major problems for the West.
That the West supports Israel does not mean it is convenient; it depends on other factors, such as the memory of the Shoah and, particularly in the United States, on a mindset partly rooted in radical religious inspiration.
For decades, Israel was a great obstacle in relations with the Arab world. One recalls the “car-free Sundays” (during the oil crisis of the 1970s): the tension between Israel and the Arab countries directly impacted the West.
But how could anyone think of controlling the Middle East through Israel? It is no coincidence that the British tried in every way to stop Jewish immigration. The presence of Israel in the Middle East is a serious obstacle for the West: all fundamentalists (like Bin Laden) and enemies of the West (Nasser, communist Russia) put the war against Israel at the forefront as a unifying banner of the Middle East against America.

For Islamic Fundamentalists
In 1979, the Khomeinist revolution revealed to a startled West—convinced that the Arab world was headed toward secularism on the Western model—that Islamic fundamentalism (religious fanaticism in our eyes) was still alive and strong among the masses. This fundamentalism spread from Shiite Iran across the region, and the West only truly realized it with the attack on the Twin Towers. Afterwards came many uprisings, culminating in the formation of the Islamic Emirate (what we call ISIS), with the ambition of reuniting the Islamic world as in the days of Muhammad’s first caliphs (the Rashidun, “rightly guided”), considered the golden age—the TRUE Islam to be revived.
In this new cultural context, the struggle that once, in PLO times, had a secular character, quickly became for Arabs a religious war. For us Westerners, Israel occupies only a small strip of land, part of Palestine, and thus it seems obvious to us that the solution must be two states. But for radical Islamists, it is not merely about reclaiming a strip of land, but a battle between good and evil, of believers against the great and little satans.
This is the essential point generally misunderstood in the West.
It is therefore not just a war of Palestinians to free their land from Zionist invaders, but a great clash of civilizations, as we would call it—even good against evil. Good is represented by the faithful of the true religion, while evil is represented above all by Americans (and Westerners in general)—godless, corrupt, and decadent men, who will soon be swept away by history, God willing (insh’Allah). Israelis are merely servants of America, instrumentalized to attack Islam.
This refers back to Khomeinist doctrine of the Great Satan, America, and the Little Satans—namely all the enemies of Islam, often including moderate and nationalist governments. It is a sort of metaphysical, eschatological clash with apocalyptic tones. Thus, the real enemy to be destroyed is not so much Israel, but America (and the entire West). For them, those who carried out the terrible massacre of October 7 are heroes, destined to receive their reward from God—paradise, where there are no infidels (Americans and Zionists)—as will all those who die in this great metaphysical clash as shaheed (witnesses of the faith).
Within this context, the theory of Waqf was developed, already recalled by Bin Laden. Waqf means “deposit,” a term used by banks to indicate an asset they administer but do not own. Palestine, the holy land from which Muhammad ascended to heaven, was entrusted—not given—by God to Muslims until the Day of Judgment. Believers, even if they wished, could not give away what does not belong to them. It is true that documents are often cited in which Hamas seems inclined toward some recognition of Israel, but these are merely draft texts, never approved, always vague and ambiguous.
But beyond all documents and speeches, it is absolutely clear that the October 7 massacre was not aimed at achieving the two-state solution, but at eliminating any recognition of Israel (and thus of two states) in the wake of the Abraham Accords. The goal is always and only the destruction of Israel, the outpost of infidels and of evil.
In reality, all Arab regimes and elites have abandoned the fight against Israel; they no longer concern themselves with Palestinians, for whom mainly we Europeans feel concern. Yet within Arab masses, a strong movement persists toward fundamentalism, and thus toward viewing Israel as the first enemy to be destroyed. That Hamas wants to destroy Israel and not create two states is undeniable, obvious to anyone with the slightest knowledge of the Palestinian question. In conclusion, for the fundamentalist vision of Islam, Israel is the symbol of evil to be destroyed.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we therefore have, schematically, four answers to the question of what Israel is:

• For secular Jews: it is the safeguard of their survival. They would support two states, but only if Arabs genuinely recognized Israel.

• For Orthodox Jews: it is the fulfillment of God’s will; the two-state solution would thus be against God’s will.

• For the Left: it is an outpost of colonialism and thus of capitalism. This idea has lost importance, remaining only within certain radical groups, though much of the European Left still opposes Israel.

• For Islamic fundamentalists: the two-state solution would be a surrender to evil; destroying Israel is a religious duty, the first step in the rebirth of Islam.

 

 

Origin

The Iranian political system is commonly thought of as an expression of a Shiite theocratic tradition. In reality, this isn't the case; it's a personal creation of Khomeini, and one, I would say, that contradicts the traditional Shiite conception of politics.

Various currents participated in the revolution against the Shah, including those inspired by socialism and Western secularism. Khomeini gained almost unanimous consensus because he was considered the heir of the recently deceased Ayatollah Ali Shariati, who held views very close to the Western left of the time. Shariati, a man of vast culture, both Islamic and Western, studied in Paris where he encountered the most vibrant post-war left-wing movements. He translated classics of left-wing thought like Sartre and even Che Guevara into Persian. He was captivated by the revolutionary and utopian ideology of the Western left with its ideals of social justice, a non-alienating society, without exploiters and exploited, which were then interpreted through a Shiite religious lens.

This explains how, in its early period, the Iranian Revolution was seen in both Europe and Iran as a left-wing revolution, albeit with an Islamic character, while it subsequently took the very different path of Khomeini. He quickly managed to marginalize all other components, concentrating all power in his charismatic figure and then developing an original constitution that is still in force today. When he came into conflict with President Bani Sadr, the latter, despite having been elected almost unanimously, had to flee within days, barely saving his life. Currently, Iran's President Pezeshkian, who would have more or less the same powers as Trump, appears to be completely ignored in practice, almost unknown to global public opinion, which instead only hears about Khamenei.

 

Structure

From a formal standpoint regarding political bodies, the Iranian constitution is similar to many other modern ones: the president of the republic is elected by direct universal suffrage, appoints ministers, and his power is counterbalanced by a parliament also elected by universal suffrage with a single-member system.

But superimposed on this system is an element that profoundly changes everything: the "Velayat-e faqih" (Guardianship of the Jurist), which is a religious authority that controls the conformity of the political bodies' actions with Islamic laws.

The Velayat-e faqih is actually made up of a Rahbar (master jurist), whom we call the Supreme Leader, assisted by twelve experts. This body would correspond to the Constitutional Courts existing under various names in modern states, but in fact, it has assumed a function of absolute power, effectively marginalizing the president.

Indeed, it does not only judge the religious conformity (i.e., the constitutionality) of laws, without delving into the merits of political action. Instead, it primarily judges who can and cannot participate in elections based on greater or lesser religious reliability. It intervenes, above all, in all political decisions, determining what is Islamic and what is not: foreign policy, alliances, the nuclear program, and domestic policy.

It should be noted that in Islam, there is no clergy as understood in Catholicism, as an intermediary between God and man, and therefore no religious leader as a representative of God on earth (the Pope with the keys of St. Peter). Therefore, the Rahbar is not the religious leader of Iranian Shiites; strictly speaking, his power is not a theocracy. The constitutional system is actually ambiguous because the limits of power for religious and civil authorities, both constitutionally provided for, are not well defined.

Even the succession was actually established by Khomeini. By his designation, the "grand ayatollah" Montazeri had been chosen, but when Montazeri began to hold different positions from him, Khomeini had him removed from the succession and placed under house arrest. Immediately afterward, Khomeini indicated Khamenei, whose only merit was absolute loyalty to his line, and who was indeed elected a few months after his death and is still the Supreme Leader.

Shiite Political Doctrine

The Shiite faction arose from the dispute over the succession of the Prophet Muhammad. When Ali, the last caliph (successor) from the House of Muhammad (Ahl al-Bayt; the people of the house) was assassinated and power then passed to the Umayyads, one of Ali's sons, al-Husayn, tried to reclaim power but was killed with 72 followers in Karbala in 680 CE. The Ashura is celebrated in remembrance of this event.

Other descendants claiming succession followed, a total of twelve "imams" starting from Ali. The last of whom was Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, known as al-Mahdī (the awaited one) who is believed not to have died in 874 CE but only to have gone into occultation, to return to earth at the end of time to establish the kingdom of God.

Shiism (the faction) is not, however, reduced to a simple dynastic struggle, but an interesting doctrine was developed that in many ways resembles Saint Augustine's "Civitas Dei." They argue that after Muhammad, a truly "just" community according to the dictates of God's law (Sharia) is not possible on earth.

The death of al-Husayn is not simply an episode of a trivial dynastic struggle, but takes on a universal and metaphysical meaning: it is the demonstration that good cannot triumph on this earth, and al-Husayn, who prefers to die with his followers rather than surrender to evil, is the martyr (shahid) par excellence, the testimony to the wickedness of men that does not allow for a truly just society. Hence the doctrine of "occultation": only at the end of time will al-Husayn return to earth to establish the truly just society.

Thus, we have a pessimism similar to the Christian pessimism of Saint Augustine: evil exists in the world; it will always remain indissolubly intertwined with good until the end of time when the world will be redeemed by the return of al-Husayn (in Saint Augustine, by the return of Christ, who will separate good from evil). In this doctrinal framework, Ashura is not simply the re-enactment of a historical event that happened many centuries ago, but it is mourning for the evil that is in the world, now as then, and in each of us. The painful penance with flagellations and self-inflicted wounds is the expiation of evil, the penance. Similarly, on our Good Friday, we remember not only the Passion of Christ but the evil that is in the world that calls for penance. In medieval traditions that have survived in some places to this day (Cusano Mutri), there are flagellations similar to those of the Shiites: the penitent expiates the evil that is also in himself, in his own sins.

In this complex ideology, the state is necessary to repress the evil that is in man ("remedium carnis," as Saint Augustine said) but cannot establish a truly just society. From this, it follows that civil power must be distinct from religious power; only with the return of Imam al-Husayn will the two powers unite in a single person, beloved by God. Shiites, therefore, like Saint Augustine and even Luther, lean towards obedience to the state even if it is, by its nature, imperfect.

Khomeini, however, superimposed a religious authority on the political power, which assumes a modern elective democratic guise, and this authority is supposed to judge whether its actions conform to God's supreme law. But in this way, political power is actually guaranteed by a religious authority and therefore could only act for the good, which Shiite doctrine properly does not admit. Inevitably, the evil that is inherent in politics by its nature, as in all society, would be transferred to the authority of the interpreters of religious doctrine.

In simple terms, if there is a religious authority that evaluates and guarantees the adherence of government acts to religious laws, then Iranian society should be a society where God's justice reigns. But this is not possible according to the Shiite conception of society, and on the other hand, no one can think that Iran is in fact a perfect society. Yet, the evil cannot be attributed to divine laws and their interpreters. Khomeini's conception is, therefore, in contrast with the traditional Shiite view.

 

 

Conclusion

In reality, Khomeini's Islamic revolution has largely failed. The theocracy has been maintained in the country for 45 years but has not spread throughout the Islamic world. In fact, the conflict has intensified, becoming open warfare with the vast majority of Sunni Islam. The ideal of theocratic governments is now pursued only by extremist and fanatical Sunni currents who, moreover, consider Shiites impious and enemies (the caliphate). For 45 years, Iran has mobilized religious consciences and strong national sentiment against an alleged international conspiracy of the entire world against the Khomeinist Revolution, with America as the "Great Satan" mobilizing the "Little Satans" of the Islamic world against the Shiite revolution. But an Iranian who follows world news a little via the internet, not only Western but also Indian, Chinese, Russian, and even Arab media like Al Jazeera, finds no enemy will in the world at all.

For the Ayatollahs, the whole world conspires against the Khomeinist revolution because the whole world fears it, because it is good against evil, light against darkness, truth against lies. But knowledge of Shiite Iran in the world is very modest. Often, journalists themselves show scarce information and, above all, scarce understanding. The world is not fighting with Iran; for the most part, it simply ignores it.

For the world, Iran's Islamic revolution is not the touchstone but merely incomprehensible fanaticism, an expression of backwardness, a danger to be eliminated if it acquires nuclear weapons. It is no coincidence that the followers of change in Iran are students, urban populations, and the bourgeois classes: they are the ones who have access to the internet and can see the rest of the world, while Khamenei's followers are mainly in the poorer, rural areas.

Indeed, in the current tragic events in Palestine, Iran's actions have appeared completely isolated, in contrast with all other Sunni states that are now leaning towards an inevitable recognition of Israel, already present in the Abraham Accords. October 7th was Hamas's desperate attempt to prevent them, which has succeeded for the moment, but at the cost of Gaza's extreme ruin.